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Introduction 
The last two decades can be characterised as a period of globalisation which has involved 
economic liberalisation combined with the opening-up of economies to international trade 
and financial flows. Economic liberalisation implied the lifting of various controls and 
restrictions and of entry barriers into specific sectors like banking, as well as the pursuit of 
market-oriented reforms, with far-reaching privatisation. Many countries competed for 
international capital, reforming their economies to attract foreign investment (see Abiad and 
Mody (2005)). As a result in many countries, including Poland, the opening-up of the 
economy has triggered massive capital flows. The main topics of the present paper are 
policy implications and the effects of these capital movements. 
The present paper consists of three distinct parts. The first is devoted to macroeconomic 
issues related to the conduct of monetary policy in the liberalised capital account 
environment of the transforming economy. The main topic of the second part is the 
development of the financial sector in the environment of free movement of capital, with a 
special focus on the Polish case. Here we analyse the role of foreign capital and investors in 
the development of the financial system: institutions, markets and instruments. The main 
conclusion of this section is that the capital inflow has greatly contributed to the evolution and 
modernisation of the Polish financial system, enhancing its efficiency and stability. The third 
part of the paper presents implications of the significant presence of foreign financial 
institutions in the domestic financial system for financial stability. These include, in particular, 
potential channels of contagion. 
I.  Capital flows and monetary policy 
I.I  Policy responses to growing capital flows 
Increasing capital flows around the world have influenced domestic policies. Growing global 
markets have made a significant contribution to improved discipline in the area of monetary 
and fiscal policies, punishing bad policies and rewarding good ones. 
The need for more disciplined monetary policies has fostered a higher degree of 
independence of central banks and contributed to global disinflation. Not only has the 
increased independence of central banks improved monetary policy practices (Rogoff 
(2006)), it has also triggered an evolution in the nature of the monetary transmission 
mechanism. Monetary policy now affects the economy more through inflation expectations 
and exchange rates (Bean (2006), Woodford (2005)). Thus, the credibility of policy has 
become a very valuable asset (Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001)). 
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On the other hand, however, growing capital flows have increased market volatilities and 
amplified the transmission of shocks, with long-term real interest rates increasingly 
determined globally. Opaqueness in financial markets limits policymakers’ ability to assess 
risks properly. Not only bad policies but also simple bad luck can be severely punished by 
the markets. The well known theoretical trilemma (pick one of two under international capital 
mobility: monetary independence or a fixed exchange rate) has become the key constraint in 
determining domestic financial policies and the level of international financial integration 
(Devereux et al (2006)). The room for manoeuvre for domestic policies has shrunk 
significantly. Higher capital mobility has decreased monetary independence and confronted 
central banks with corner choices in implementing monetary policy. In practice it has become 
clear that in a world with increasing capital mobility it is more difficult to maintain the fixed 
exchange rate strategy than to conduct independent monetary policy. 
Many countries have operated a monetary policy regime based on fixed exchange rates. The 
smooth changeover to a floating exchange rate regime was (and in some cases still is) 
complicated in many dimensions, thus inducing so-called “fear of floating”. Some countries 
attempted to conduct a kind of eclectic monetary policy regime, combining some elements of 
inflation targeting with rather strict interventions in the foreign exchange markets in order to 
manage the exchange rate. In both cases increasing capital flows can easily undermine such 
an approach. The probability of a fixed exchange rate regime lasting eight years has been 
calculated to be below 0.3 (Spiegel (2007)). 
Some countries have tried to limit financial flows using capital controls. These measures, 
however, have proved insufficient and, in most cases, ineffective, creating ways to 
circumvent the restrictions and thus distorting the normal functions of financial systems and 
markets. Even the case of Chile, presented as a success story, is debatable as strict capital 
controls (well prepared and based on the existing reporting and supervisory infrastructure) 
changed the structure and duration rather than the scale of flows (see Sławiński and Dusza 
(1998)). 
In a catching-up economy, a fixed exchange rate regime does not protect the currency from 
real appreciation. Thus, it seems that an appropriate policy response to large (actual or 
potential) capital flows should be pursuing price stability and anchoring inflation expectations. 
The transition from a fixed to a floating exchange rate regime can, however, lead to high 
exchange rate volatility (as markets test the new equilibrium levels and/or test the solidity of 
the authorities’ commitment). This could bring about a loss of competitiveness and high 
economic costs, especially in cases where the regime changeover is combined with a 
disinflation process. The pace of nominal appreciation matters. Some countries have used 
the above-mentioned eclectic approach to manage the transitory period smoothly (Pruski and 
Szpunar (2005)). A gradual, orderly regime changeover should reduce the macroeconomic 
costs of economic agents’ adjustment to higher exchange rate volatility (see Graphs 3 and 4 
and Table 1). 
In the long run, however, monetary policy with low stable inflation as a target should 
contribute to exchange rate stabilisation. Two countries with price stability targets should 
have a relatively muted exchange rate, of course with reservations regarding some market 
and economic factors like market sentiment, potential tensions, the HBS effect, etc. 
I.II  Inflation targeting in coping with capital inflows  
Empirical evidence supports the view that inflation targeting as a corner solution combined 
with free floating is an appropriate response to capital flows. An inflation targeting regime 
seems to immunise economies against the consequences of capital flows and accompanying 
shifts in exchange rates. First, exchange rate movements do not necessarily need to be 
hampered by foreign exchange interventions. Under inflation targeting a central bank uses its 
own interest rate, which it controls to a much greater extent than exchange rates (as it has 
the monopoly on issue of its own domestic currency). Second, even large shifts in exchange BIS Papers No 44  405
 
 
rates become less harmful as economic agents have to be prepared for them (no implicit 
guarantees) and there are instruments available to cope with exchange rate risk. Thus, the 
macroeconomic cost of exchange rate volatility declines with time. In many cases, pass-
through coefficients also drop as economic agents adjust to the environment of exchange 
rate volatility (see Annex 1). Finally, after the initial volatility under the regime changeover, 
exchange rate movements may decrease (Graph 1 shows an example for Poland in the last 
two years).  
Graph 1 
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Source: NBP data. 
Long-term capital flows, especially foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, can also influence 
the conduct of monetary policy under an inflation targeting framework. High levels of foreign 
investor participation in the banking sector might modify the functioning of the credit channel 
in the monetary transmission mechanism, because of the access of domestic banks to 
sources of funding in foreign parent institutions. On the other hand, access to parent bank 
funding may stabilise the supply of funds and smooth the fluctuations that might result from 
the business cycles. This has been observed in some countries. In Poland, however, the 
scale of intragroup financing of domestic banks has not been large, and thus has not had a 
serious impact on the conduct of monetary policy. A larger impact was probably seen 
through the improvement of banking sector efficiency as well as through increased financing 
of the real sector of the economy, mainly households.  
Yet, inflation targeters are few and relatively recent among emerging market economies. On 
the other hand, however, in many countries the experience with inflation targeting does not 
span an entire business cycle, so the new regime has not really been tested. In addition, 
inflation targeting under limited policy credibility may lead to greater volatility and a 
procyclical policy stance. There is probably still some “fear of floating” – avoiding real 
exchange rate volatility is considered an important policy objective in small open emerging 
economies, as the exchange rate may be the most important determinant of domestic 
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regime may result from: high pass-through, a high share of volatile prices in the CPI basket 
(eg food), a low level of monetisation or a high level of dollarisation/euroisation. While these 
obstacles may appear serious, some of them can be easily overestimated. The experience of 
Poland shows that the most important conditions for inflation targeting encompass: central 
bank instrument independence, an adequately developed financial system (with an interbank 
deposit market as the key ingredient), sufficient money market infrastructure (effective 
interest rate setting, reflecting market conditions), and efficient liquidity management by the 
central bank (monetary operations). This experience also makes it clear that some other 
elements (often highlighted in the literature; see Christoffersen et al (1999)) were of minor 
importance during the initial phase of the changeover to the inflation targeting regime and 
could be developed gradually thereafter, for example the MTM models or more sophisticated 
strategy and communication. 
Summing up, the experience of Poland with an inflation targeting regime seems to have been 
largely positive so far. Despite high capital flows and exchange rate fluctuations, strong 
economic growth accompanied by low inflation and low current account deficits has been 
achieved. The new strategy has helped reduce inflation and stabilise it at a low level and in 
this way enhanced the credibility of the monetary authorities (see Graph 2). Inflation targeting 
has facilitated control over inflation and delivered an instrument to influence credit growth, 
which is also important for the stability of the financial sector. At the same time, inflation 
targeting offers more flexibility, including higher resistance to capital flows. It has also helped 
avoid vulnerability, as there have been no implicit guarantees inducing moral hazard 
behaviour on the part of economic agents. It has not, however, prevented the advance of 
currency substitution in domestic credit markets, especially in the housing loan market, which 
weakens the monetary transmission mechanism and increases households’ exposure to 
foreign exchange risk. To some extent, currency substitution may have even been bolstered 
by the gradual strengthening and low volatility of the Polish zloty since 2004. 
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Macroeconomic developments under the inflation 
targeting regime in Poland 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Annual average change, in per cent 
CPI  11.8 7.3  10.1 5.5 1.9 0.8 3.5 2.1 1.0 2.5 
GDP  5.0 4.5 4.3 1.2 1.4 3.9 5.3 3.6 6.1 6.2
1 
Domestic demand  6.4 5.2 3.1  –1.3 0.9 2.7 6.0 2.4 6.6 6.3
1 
Real effective 
exchange rate   4.7 –3.4  9.7 12.5 –3.7 –9.3  0.7 12.6  2.7  5.5 
As of December each year, in per cent 
NBP interest rate  15.50 16.50 19.00 11.50 6.75 5.25 6.50 4.50  4.00  5.00 
As a percentage of GDP 
Current account 
balance  –4.0 –7.4 –5.8 –2.8 –2.5 –2.1 –4.3 –1.6 –3.2 –3.7
2 
FDI in Poland  3.7 4.3 5.5 3.0 2.1 2.1 5.1 3.4 5.6  ... 
Portfolio investment  1.1 0.4 1.9 0.6 1.6 1.7 4.2 4.9 0.5  ... 
Financial 
derivatives  0.0  0.3  0.2 –0.2 –0.5 –0.4  0.1  0.1 –0.2  ... 
Loans to 
corporations (stock)  4.5 6.1 6.6 7.3 7.6 8.5 6.5 6.3 6.8  ... 
Official reserve 
assets (stock)  16.5 17.0 15.3 13.6 14.1 15.2 11.9 14.1 13.3  ... 
Public finance 
balance, ESA95  –4.3 –2.3 –3.0 –5.1 –5.0 –6.3 –5.7 –4.3 –3.9 –2.5
1 
... = not available. 
1  Estimates available as of February 2008.    
2  As of third quarter of 2007.    
Sources: NBP data; Central Statistical Office. 
 
II.  Capital flows and the financial system  
Financial development constitutes a potentially important mechanism for long-term growth. 
Numerous studies show that the opening-up of the domestic economy to foreign competition, 
as well as the establishment of appropriate economic institutions, seems crucial in this 
respect (see Rajan and Zingales (2003) and Baltagi et al (2007)). Foreign investors have 
played a very important role in the development of the Polish financial system, with regard to 
both financial institutions and financial markets. Their visible presence was the result of the 
liberalisation of financial and capital flows carried out mainly during the 1990s (see Graph 5). 
Financial liberalisation was one of the fundamental market-oriented reforms implemented at 
the beginning of the transformation in Poland, and included both domestic reforms and 
policies and the gradual lifting of foreign exchange controls. The former involved reducing BIS Papers No 44  409
 
 
entry barriers to the financial market for new entities with a different ownership structure. The 
legal framework for the latter included a new act on foreign exchange controls, an act on 
investment with participation of foreign entities adopted in mid-1991, and further measures 
implemented later. These measures were connected with Poland’s entry into the OECD and 
its accession to the European Union. There were many drivers behind this liberalisation 
process, including: 
•  assuring access to foreign funding to facilitate the modernisation of the economy 
and to provide capital in the absence of domestic sources of funds at the beginning 
of the transition; 
•  ensuring access to modern technology and management skills, to make the 
economy competitive and efficient; 
•  enabling participation in the global economy and international division of labour. 
The full adjustment to OECD capital flow rules was made in 2002, when the remaining 
restrictions on short-term operations were lifted. The high presence of foreign capital has 
strongly influenced the characteristics of the Polish financial system and its ability to 
withstand shocks (financial stability). 
II.I Financial  institutions 
Foreign investors are now majority owners of most Polish financial institutions. They control 
71% of the capital of the Polish banking sector, 77% of the insurance sector, and 40% of the 
pension funds sector, as well as 26% of investment funds (as at the end of 2006). This key 
role of foreign capital is the result of the fact that due to historical reasons, the amount of 
domestic private capital available at the beginning of the transition process was low. The 
process of increasing the presence of foreign investors has been a gradual one. The 
developments in the banking sector can serve as a good example of this process, which 
comprised both FDI and portfolio investment. In the former case, three forms were present: 
privatisation of existing banks, takeovers of Polish private banks and greenfield investment. 
During the 1990s the inflow of FDI to Poland paved the way for an efficient privatisation of 
Polish banks (NBP (2003)), which play a key role in the Polish financial sector.
3 The 
privatisation methods used have evolved over time and at first only limited participation of the 
strategic investors was allowed. It took some time for investors to take the dominant position 
in the equity capital of banks by the acquisition of shares on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, 
which also included new issues of shares.
4 Some private banks changed their ownership 
structure and gradually became subsidiaries of foreign institutions. Gradually, the 
government attitude changed, and the privatisation strategy adopted in the late 1990s 
involved the sale of a majority of shares to a single strategic investor. That was supportive in 
selecting the best suited and most reputable candidates for investors, as well as in 
negotiating the price and additional conditions of the privatisation deals. At present, most 
large Polish banks are subsidiaries of foreign banks with head offices typically in the EU 
15 countries.  
The access of foreign financial institutions to the Polish market through greenfield investment 
has also evolved through the years. The early 1990s saw only few banks established as 
greenfield institutions. Those greenfield banks, which had operated since the early stages of 
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the transformation, were very successful and profitable, specialising in corporate banking 
and trade finance. The Polish market attracted greater interest after a successful 
restructuring of the banking sector and upon Poland receiving a positive credit rating in the 
mid-1990s. 
After the completion of the privatisation of the banking sector and entry into the European 
Union, the pattern of capital inflows to the financial sector started to change. Since 1 May 
2004 new entrants to the Polish market have been mostly branches.
5 Foreign direct 
investment in banks which are subsidiaries of foreign institutions mostly takes the form of an 
accrual of retained earnings. In banks with a low deposit base, the inflow of capital takes the 
form of acceptance by the parent bank of subordinate debentures or issuance of other types 
of debt securities by the Polish subsidiary. The attractiveness of Poland for foreign 
investment has stemmed from the development of an appropriate institutional environment, 
including a legal and regulatory framework. Moreover, the prompt and successful 
restructuring of state banks has greatly helped in improving Poland’s reputation abroad and 
in drawing the attention of potential investors. The other important factor was the accession 
process and entry into the European Union in 2004.  
Analysing the tendencies in foreign capital inflows to the Polish banking sector in the last 
decade according to their type, three distinct periods can be distinguished: 1997–98,   
1999–2003 and 2004–06. The first period was characterised by a high share of FDI flows in 
total inflows, reaching 40–50%, decreasing portfolio inflows and an increasing role of credit 
and other types of debt. The second period can be characterised by a still high share of FDI, 
ranging from 47 to 56%, but much lower portfolio investment and a steady share of foreign 
credit inflow. The third period was characterised by a drop in the FDI share to 32%, with 
simultaneous strong growth in portfolio investment and a high, but steady share of credit and 
other types of debt. The changes in the structure of flows were the results of changes in 
public policy towards foreign investor access to the Polish banking sector, including 
privatisation, and the situation of the banks themselves (mainly their capital buffer levels and 
tendencies in their liquidity position).  
The banking sector in Poland is the largest segment of its financial system, accounting for 
71% of its assets in 2006. But the liberalisation of capital flows has provided the possibility of 
raising funds directly from international markets, and large amounts of FDI in the real sector 
of the economy have caused the banking sector’s role in the supply of funds for financing 
domestic enterprises to be smaller and less dynamic than originally expected. The cross-
border financing of companies by their parent institutions has played an especially important 
role (see Graph 6). Contrary to this, the financing of the household sector is completely 
dominated by banking institutions.  
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II.II   Financial markets 
Foreign investors have also contributed significantly to the development of financial markets 
in Poland. The emergence of some segments, notably the over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives market, was due to the activity of London-based banks. Foreign players have 
made substantial contributions to the liquidity of the markets in which they operate. In some 
Polish financial markets non-residents play a dominant role (for example the foreign 
exchange spot market and OTC derivatives market). 
The development of the OTC market for derivative instruments – for both currencies and 
interest rates – would not have been possible without foreign banks. Such instruments (non-
deliverable forwards, interest rate swaps, forward rate agreements, foreign exchange 
options) started being traded in the mid-1990s on the London market. Polish banks have 
successively joined that market. Currently foreign banks are very active participants in the 
OTC derivatives market (their share in net turnover on the domestic interest rate instruments 
market exceeds 50%). Part of foreign banks’ investments in Polish treasury bonds is funded 
on the FX swap market (by rolling over T/N zloty loans). The share of foreign banks in net 
turnover on the FX swap market exceeds 90%. FX swaps have commonly been used in 
carry trade transactions. Foreign banks are very active on the domestic FX spot market; their 
share in net turnover on the zloty market has reached 70%. The liquidity on that market is 
primarily created by foreign banks. These banks also have large positions in off-balance 
sheet interest rate instruments. Large exposures in BPVs
6 without flows of funds show that 
transactions serve speculative or hedging purposes. Some derivative instruments would not 
be offered by banks active in Poland, if not used to offset the exposures resulting from their 
sale (hedge back-to-back) to banks abroad (mainly parent banks). In the case of more 
sophisticated instruments, such as foreign exchange exotic options and interest rate options, 
banks in Poland only play the role of agents in their sale. 
The importance of foreign players can be seen in the example of the futures and options 
market of the Warsaw Stock Exchange. This has been developing in a different way to 
previously mentioned market segments, with relatively lower participation of non-residents 
(their share in futures contract turnover did not exceed 4% in 1999–2004, while in 2006 the 
share of non-residents in futures contracts was 9% and in options 3%). The market is still of 
minor importance in Poland and its liquidity is not comparable to that of the OTC market. 
Foreign capital has also contributed to the development of the equity market. In the mid-
1990s, at the early stage of stock market functioning in Poland, the market was characterised 
by low capitalisation, a limited number of listed companies and high investment risk. Foreign 
investors were an important source of capital for listed Polish companies (their share in 
capitalisation was nearly 30%). With the development of the stock market in Poland (growth 
in capitalisation, new companies listed, privatisation) foreign participation in shares of 
domestic companies on the Polish market grew and by the end of the 1990s reached 50%. A 
record high level (60% of capitalisation) was achieved in 2004. Since then foreign players’ 
share in the market has been falling, due to both strong demand on the side of domestic 
investors and some withdrawal of foreign capital from the Warsaw Stock Exchange (strong 
profit-taking after 2005), as well as a number of IPOs of Polish private companies. One 
should add that around two thirds of foreign investors on the Warsaw Stock Exchange are 
direct investors (taking into account the share in the value of investment).  
The activity of foreign institutions has been especially important for the build-up of liquidity in 
the financial markets. The liquidity ratios of the stock and bond markets have been steadily 
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improving. The share of foreign investors in stock market turnover in 1996–2006 was over 
30%; in 2005 it exceeded 40%. Foreign investors are very active in the most liquid segments 
of the Polish financial market, and provide a substantial contribution to their liquidity. These 
segments comprise stocks which belong to the WIG20 index basket (90% of the stock 
portfolio of non-residents is placed in WIG20 companies) and the benchmark bond market 
(non-residents accounted for over 36% of turnover in the treasury bond market in 2006). 
These findings are confirmed by such measures as the turnover/capitalisation ratio (in the 
case of stocks) the bid-ask spread, and the Hui-Heubel ratio. After pension funds, foreign 
investors are the second largest group of investors on the Polish bond market, with a 22% 
share at the end of June 2007. The drop in non-residents’ activity in the third quarter of 2005 
had a serious impact on bond market liquidity, evidenced by an increase in the vulnerability 
of bond yields to changes in benchmark bonds’ turnover, as measured by the Hui-Heubel 
ratio. 
III.   Strong presence of foreign capital and financial stability  
The inflow of foreign capital has facilitated the development of Poland’s financial institutions 
and markets. Its potential adverse macroeconomic effects have been moderated by an 
adequate choice of monetary policy framework and its rigorous execution. This has led to 
generally positive results in the area of financial stability, although some potentially negative 
results of the process can also be identified. In an open financial system, certain channels of 
international contagion may arise due to exposure to international financial markets.   
The flow of foreign investment to Poland seems comparable to the pattern observed in 
countries undergoing similar changes and transforming into market economies. In most 
countries in transition the creation of a stable banking sector has implied the active 
participation of foreign investors. Those countries that have attempted to develop the 
banking sector relying to a great extent on domestic capital have eventually ended up facing 
banking crises or at least major difficulties (as examples one may quote, among EU member 
countries, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia). This has confirmed the results 
of international studies, which show that the presence of foreign investors in the financial 
sector improves its resilience to external shocks and assures the stability of credit supply and 
overall financial stability (see Clarke et al (2003)). There are also opinions that in deep 
crises, the presence of foreign capital protects the domestic market from capital outflows 
(see Peek and Rosengren (2000)).  
The participation of foreign strategic investors in Poland, as in most transition countries, has 
facilitated the development and modernisation of the financial sector, primarily by the transfer 
of know-how. As a result of the presence of foreign investors, one could observe an increase 
in market competition resulting in an increase in the efficiency of financial institutions. 
Foreign investment has led to a wider variety of financial products becoming available to 
non-financial sectors. This has encouraged the process of diversification of assets of 
households and corporations, diminishing their vulnerability to possible shocks. The same 
process can be observed on the liability side of their balance sheets. 
Risk management at foreign-owned institutions 
The transfer of know-how has been especially valuable in the area of risk management. The 
transfer of developed in-house risk management systems has brought major improvement in 
this area. This has resulted in a tightening of credit policies and practices and a more 
determined attitude towards non-performing loan (NPL) resolution (see BIS (2004)) reflected 
in the steep increases in NPLs just after the takeover of domestic banks. In the long run this 
process has also caused a structural change in the allocation of capital in the economy, 
based only on business considerations. The credit policies followed by the new banks 414  BIS Papers No 44
 
 
differed greatly from domestic banks’ policies before their privatisation. State-owned banks 
granted credit mostly to their traditional customers from the public sector (related party 
lending), while private and privatised banks, especially those with foreign owners, usually 
follow different patterns. They tend to provide funding to companies from more 
technologically advanced sectors, to be more competitive and efficient, to rely on more 
formal credit assessment standards and to apply risk-adjusted pricing. This change was 
anticipated by reformers when transforming the banking sector, as they decided to leave 
capital allocation in the economy to the independent, private banks. 
The result of a change in risk management was also visible in the price of credit. Contrary to 
common views, recent studies conducted at the NBP have shown that the presence of 
foreign banks has a positive impact on the cost of credit to clients (Degryse et al (2007)). The 
lowest credit rates were offered by banks controlled by foreign entities, which started their 
operations as greenfield institutions. The second lowest came from banks privatised with the 
participation of foreign strategic investors, due to their better assessment of credit risk. 
Acquiring strong strategic owners has also resulted in a lowering of the cost of credit to 
banks themselves, as this fact positively influenced domestic banks’ ratings.  
The organisation of risk management systems in numerous banking groups may also 
constitute a challenge to financial stability. Some banking groups tend to centralise risk 
management functions, meaning that decisions concerning risk exposure and management 
methods are made at the parent banks’ head offices. Such a division of power among the 
dominant and subordinate entities may lead to a lack of more sophisticated risk management 
skills among domestic managers.   
Another problem emerges in banking groups where a matrix management system is utilised. 
The balance sheet structure of a domestic bank can be optimal from the group perspective, 
but if acting as a standalone entity, the domestic bank’s structure can be far from this state. 
Among the advantages of the way in which foreign strategic investors run Polish banks, one 
could name the insulation from direct negative effects of large international exposures, but 
this has a negative side as well. Concentration mainly on domestic activities limits the 
diversification of assets of banks, increasing their vulnerability in the case of shocks to the 
Polish economy. 
Strategic ownership and intragroup division of power 
The Polish experience shows that strategic foreign owners (mainly parent banks) have 
contributed to the stability of domestic banks through other channels as well. Having a 
strategic investor brings the asset of reputation to a bank. While at the beginning of the 21st 
century the overall level of NPLs in the Polish banking system had reached 21% of the total 
loan portfolio and, in the case of some banks, an increase in NPLs resulted in financial 
losses, strategic owners constituted a serious source of capital.  
It has to be remembered that Poland has yet to experience a crisis situation involving a 
foreign-owned bank. The experiences of other countries in this field vary. The case of 
Rijecka Banka, the third largest bank in Croatia, shows that the support of a majority investor 
cannot be treated as a given. An NBP survey on this issue (NBP (2007)) reveals that some 
banks can count on liquidity support from foreign owners (in the form of credit lines). 
According to estimates based on NBP survey data, these banks hold nearly 25% of deposits 
of non-financial entities. Banks holding 40% of deposits of non-financial entities have been 
provided with a promise of liquidity support in a less binding form (eg a promise contained in 
the financial reports of a capital group or submitted to the Commission for Banking 
Supervision). However, meeting contractual obligations may depend on the liquidity of the 
owners (parent banks), especially in periods of stress, when refinancing on the interbank 
monetary market is difficult or costly, for example as in early August 2007. Recent 
developments in the global markets, which led to the liquidity crisis in the European market in BIS Papers No 44  415
 
 
particular (see Section II.I) and in the United States, had no impact on the liquidity of the 
Polish banking sector. 
Polish banks, as subsidiaries of global or large European banking groups, do not invest 
directly in the global markets. Thus, Polish banks were not directly influenced by the recent 
turmoil in global markets caused by the US subprime crisis. The owners had also decided 
that they should mainly specialise in providing services to domestic clients, and this has so 
far insulated the Polish banking system from the outcome of the crisis. 
New channels of contagion 
In spite of the current state of insulation from the subprime fallout, several channels of 
possible contagion may be identified. These include the credit, funding, capital and 
confidence channels, which are elaborated on hereafter. 
Contagion through the credit channel arises due to domestic banks’ credit exposures to 
foreign entities, especially foreign financial institutions. Although these exposures are 
generally low and diversified, there is a risk of a sudden increase in intragroup exposure if a 
parent company experiences liquidity or solvency problems. The parent company may 
attempt to gather funding from subsidiaries at a low price which would not compensate for 
credit risk. In the short run, this could result in turmoil in domestic financial markets as the 
affected subsidiary would be forced to raise cash and convert it into foreign currency. Due to 
the opacity of financial markets, such a fire sale could even incite a crisis of confidence within 
the financial sector. The risk profile of the affected institution would also be put under 
pressure. In the longer run, if default on the intragroup loan became likely, the solvency of 
the affected institution could be compromised. For Poland, the likelihood of credit channel 
contagion can be assessed as low due to, inter alia, the systemic importance in their 
domestic markets of foreign banking groups which operate in Poland and – as demonstrated 
in summer 2007 – EU banking groups’ preference for using ECB liquidity operations instead 
of intragroup support. Still, if credit channel contagion did materialise, its impact could be 
very severe, as in extreme situations the subsidiary might need to provide credit to an 
insolvent parent company. 
The funding channel is linked to foreign funding of domestic financial institutions. Short-term 
foreign funding could be very volatile in times of crisis, especially if it is not provided by the 
group. If foreign funding sources form a substantial part of a bank’s liabilities, the bank might 
be unable to replace them and forced to sell assets at distressed prices. This would induce 
market turmoil as well as halt loan supply. As short-term foreign funding does not constitute a 
very significant component of Polish banks’ liabilities, a shortage in such funding would not 
threaten overall financial stability. Some small Polish institutions, however, rely on intragroup 
funding. In several EU countries, foreign banks acting as strategic owners play an important 
role as the source of financing for the credit expansion of domestic banks. The case of the 
Baltic countries shows that in extreme cases, such reliance could lead to very large macro 
imbalances in the domestic economy, as well as the build-up of a potential asset bubble, and 
render domestic institutions vulnerable to liquidity conditions in the international markets. 
Foreign-owned financial institutions are also reliant on parent companies’ ability to provide 
them with capital if they intend to expand. Problems at the parent company, however, may 
prompt a large dividend payout, in line with the short-term interest of the investor. This would 
hamper the growth potential of the subsidiary and could lead to suboptimal allocation of 
credit as some investment opportunities would not be pursued due to overly restrictive 
financial constraints. If, on the other hand, the subsidiary needs recapitalisation after a 
substantial loss, and the parent company is unwilling to commit capital, a threat to financial 
stability could materialise. Due to disproportionalities in the development of financial markets 
in Poland and in the investors’ countries of origin, banks may be systemically important to the 
host country (thus requiring a great deal of attention and scrupulous supervision), while at 
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a whole or investors in the country of origin (which may be an incentive to minimise 
supervision costs). This will also cast doubt on the ability and will to act in a crisis situation. 
Given that several subsidiaries of foreign banking groups operate under the group’s brand, 
reports on group losses may be associated by the public with the current standing of the 
local subsidiary. This in turn could trigger a decline in confidence in the subsidiary, up to a 
sudden withdrawal of deposits. Similar effects may appear in the interbank markets, 
especially when exact linkages between the parent and subsidiary are uncertain.      
Capital flows, liquidity of financial markets and availability of credit 
Foreign investors are positively influencing the stability of the Polish financial system by 
contributing to the development of financial markets. Contributions have included creating a 
market for risk hedging instruments, increasing the liquidity of the markets and diversifying 
the investor base. The diversification and expansion of the investor base has contributed to 
stability by eliminating the negative consequences of investment limits of some large 
domestic institutional investors. This brings the benefits of diversified objectives and 
preferences. The existence of this effect is confirmed by the correlation between the monthly 
transaction balance of foreign investors and the monthly balance of investment transactions 
of Polish pension funds, which were strongly negative in 2006 (–0.624). The activities of 
investors from different countries are also determined by events on their local markets. This 
contributes to market liquidity, making transactions easier to perform, allowing specific 
strategies to be pursued (see Grossman (1977)), and facilitating hedging activities. 
Financial stability is also enhanced by the activity of foreign capital in the non-financial sector 
of the economy. A large part of the foreign indebtedness of Polish enterprises (40%) consists 
of intragroup exposures. This means that besides the relatively strong growth of foreign debt 
of this sector of economy (in the last 10 years it has increased from 2.3% to 6.5% of GDP), 
financing conditions seem very stable.  
Competition in the banking market and financial stability  
The majority of foreign owners of Polish banks are large complex European banks. We are 
currently observing the process of the creation of a single pan-European financial market. 
One of the symptoms of this process is increasing concentration in the EU banking system. 
The side effects of the concentration in home markets are bank mergers in host countries, 
resulting in the creation of large, systemically important institutions. This has further 
implications for the financial stability of the host country financial system, namely the effect 
on competition in the domestic banking sector and the incentives for home and host 
supervisory institutions to act promptly in normal times, as well as in crisis situations.  
We have mentioned the very positive general effects of large foreign capital activity on the 
development of Polish financial markets and, through this, on the stability of the Polish 
financial system. The consequences of strong capital inflows and strong foreign presence in 
the financial system and the economy as a whole cannot, however, be assessed 
unambiguously. There are several potentially negative side effects of this situation for both 
financial development and stability. The widespread foreign ownership of financial 
institutions, especially systemically important banks, creates new channels of contagion from 
parent banks and the markets in which they operate to domestic banks. In the event of 
distress at a parent institution the reputation asset becomes reputation risk. It is also worth 
mentioning that the way in which foreign investors operate (intragroup financing, 
centralisation of risk management) has contributed to the underdevelopment of some 
financial market segments in Poland, namely the corporate bond market, credit derivatives, 




Increasing capital flows, facilitated by financial and capital account liberalisation in numerous 
countries, have created a new macroeconomic environment across the globe. The last two 
decades can be characterised as a period of globalisation, which has involved economic 
liberalisation combined with an opening-up of economies to international trade and financial 
flows. Economic liberalisation implied the lifting of various controls and restrictions and of 
entry barriers into specific sectors like banking, as well as the pursuit of market-oriented 
reforms, with far-reaching privatisation. Many countries opened up their economies in order 
to compete for international capital and reformed their economies to attract foreign 
investment (see Abiad and Mody (2005)). This in turn induced massive flows of capital and 
fluctuations in exchange rates. In the central and eastern European (CEE) countries, 
including Poland, these processes accompanied the transition from central planning to 
market economy. 
Focusing on the case of Poland, we have analysed the consequences of increasing capital 
flows for both the conduct of monetary policy and financial market stability and development. 
We have learned that inflation targeting constitutes the appropriate strategy to cope with 
increasing capital flows and the associated negative consequences for exchange rate 
stability. The experience of Poland shows that under an inflation targeting regime, strong 
economic growth accompanied by low inflation and low current account deficits have been 
achieved despite high capital flows and exchange rate fluctuations (see Table 1). Inflation 
targeting has facilitated control of inflation and delivered instruments to influence domestic 
demand and credit growth, which is also important for the stability of the financial sector. At 
the same time inflation targeting allows the economy to respond more flexibly to higher 
resistance to capital flows. It also helps avoid vulnerability, as there are no implicit 
guarantees inducing moral hazard behaviour among economic agents (see Table A1). 
On the other hand, the opening-up of the capital account has enabled Poland to attract large 
FDI flows, including those flowing into the financial system. These inflows have greatly 
contributed to the evolution and modernisation of the Polish financial system, as well as its 
efficiency and stability, in a number of ways (see Graph 5).  
First, the presence of investors has considerably accelerated the development of financial 
markets and instruments (for example the issuance of short-term market debt instruments 
and the development of hedging instruments). Second, as active traders they have been 
providing liquidity to various markets. Third, foreign-owned banks have supported the 
development of the banking sector. They have been a source of technology diffusion, 
including risk management techniques – for example through staff turnover or demonstration 
effect, and also via the market transactions performed with other banks. Some foreign-owned 
banks have been leaders in bringing advanced customer products to the market and in 
implementing high standards of customer service. This has also stimulated competition in 
various market segments which have been expanding from corporate to retail customers and 
intensifying, exerting pressure on the cost of credit and lending conditions. Foreign investors 
have undoubtedly had a positive influence on the stability of the Polish banking sector. Their 
involvement in the restructuring of the sector in the form of capital injections has enabled 
many banks to survive and prevented the failure of many major banks.  
The examples of several countries suggest that the presence of foreign strategic investors 
does not guarantee unconditionally the safety of domestic banks and therefore the stability of 
the domestic financial system. New channels of contagion could emerge in line with 
increasing intragroup linkages. The experience of Poland to date has shown that all the 
positive effects of opening to foreign capital and the high presence of foreign investors have 
materialised while the negative aspects have so far remained absent. This does not mean, 












Has PT coefficient 
declined recently? 
Main reason for 
PT decline 
Relative size 






  No evidence that PT 
declined 
    




Malaysia    No; PT relatively 
stable in 1990–2006 
    
Philippines  1.2%  Yes, from 23% before 
1993 
    PT is generally very 
low 
Singapore 3%      CPIPT  < 
Imp.PricePT 
Complete PT after two 
years 
Thailand  Small  Increased slightly  ER flexibility  CPIPT << 
Prod.Pr.PT << 
Imp.Pr.PT 
PT to import prices full 
and rapid; 
PT to CPI not full even 
in the long run 
Colombia 3%  in 
2006 
Yes, from 4–5% in 
mid-1980s 
    
Peru 10%  in 
2006 
Yes, from 10–20% in 
2001–04 
    
Venezuela    Yes, during 2005–06  FX reserves↑;















Poland 12%  in 
2006 





 Asymmetric  response 
of PT (ER↓ > ER↑) 
Israel 23%  in 
1999–2004 





  Half of PT via rental 




Yes, from 63% before 
the float 
    Full PT takes one year
(versus four–five 
months before) 
South Africa  7.8%  Not clear that PT has 
declined 
   Asymmetric,  threshold 
effects apply 
1  Percentage increase in the CPI following a 10% depreciation of the exchange rate (individual national definitions may differ 
slightly). 





Banking sector assets, credits and deposits in CEE countries 
and selected EU and euro area countries in 2004–06 
As a percentage of GDP  
Assets/GDP Credits/GDP  Deposits/GDP 
 
2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 
Czech 
Republic
  93.5 98.7 97.9 32.5 37.5 43.3 57.0 58.5 60.2 
Hungary
  72.0 79.8 88.4 35.1 39.3 43.4 32.9 34.1 35.5 
Poland  58.2 59.7 64.4 24.7 26.3 30.6 32.8 33.5 35.5 
2005 
Austria 264.5  156.4  100.6 
Estonia 107.0  59.3  48.5 
Germany 299.5  91.7  61.2 
Italy 163.8  61.7  42.9 
Lithuania 63.0  36.5  35.3 
Portugal 243.7  137.4  93.3 
Euro area 
countries  283.3 123.5  102.0 
Sources: ECB (2006); national central banks; Eurostat. 
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